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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic)
competition, a transition from separate accounting (SA) to formula appor-
tionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of profit shifting via transfer
pricing. In particular, if aﬃliates of a multinational firm face oligopolistic com-
petition, it is beneficial for the multinational to manipulate transfer prices for
tax-saving as well as strategic reasons under both FA and SA. The analysis
shows that a switch from SA rules to FA rules may actually strengthen profit
shifting activities by multinationals.
∗Corresponding author: Guttorm Schjelderup, NHH, Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway. E-
mail: Guttorm.schjelderup@nhh.no
1
1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a widespread discussion on the relation between national
tax systems and the strategic decisions on the part of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) concerning the location of their investment, production and profits. At the
heart of the matter is the fear that low-tax countries may attract a disproportionate
share of the activities of MNEs at the expense of high-tax countries.
Equally worrisome are the possibilities open for MNEs to shift income from high-
tax to low-tax jurisdictions. Such income shifting can be undertaken by choosing
transfer prices for intra-firm transactions that would increase costs in high-tax ju-
risdictions and income in low-tax jurisdictions. At present, the taxation of profits
of MNEs is in most countries based on Separate Accounting (SA) principles. Under
SA, total income by the MNE is divided among its aﬃliates based on each aﬃli-
ate’s accounts and the application of an arm’s length pricing standard for intra-firm
transactions. Since the price on such intra-company transactions often is not observ-
able in the market place, national tax authorities rely on several methods to impute
the price that would have obtained between independent parties. These methods
involve either the use of (a) comparable arm’s length prices for similar transactions,
(b) estimated costs plus a profit margin, (c) the resale price (achieved by subtracting
a measure of profits from the sales price), (d) split profits (that is, partitioning of
profits between the vendor and the purchaser), or (e) comparable profit measures.1
Not only are these methods imperfect and costly to administrate, but the use of
arm’s length pricing standards are not coordinated internationally. Hence, there is
a potential of conflict between states that happen to use diﬀerent standards on the
same transaction.2
Recently policy-makers and economists have pointed out that the problems re-
lated to profit shifting and Transfer Pricing (TP) under SA warrant a switch to a
1The US has recently enacted laws that allow the use of quite diﬀerent schemes to curb transfer
pricing such as the Comparable Profits method (see Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1999), for an
analysis) and the Advanced Pricing scheme.
2See Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (1998) for an analysis of this issue.
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system more similar to that practiced by the US on domestic firms.3 When taxing
domestic firms located in diﬀerent states, the US does not rely on SA but instead on
formulas to calculate the tax base applicable in individual states. These formulas in
eﬀect apportion US assets, sales, and/or payroll to any individual state in which the
firms operate and then use these shares to compute the base applicable for taxation
in that state.4 This system, called Formula Apportionment (FA), is by many seen
as a superior method of taxing multinationals, since it ensures that MNEs cannot
evade taxation in any single state as long as it has some activity going on in that
state. FA, therefore, is perceived to curtail or even eliminate the incentives for using
TP to shift profits into low-tax countries. Although there are some disadvantages
related to the use of FA, for example, that it may under certain circumstances create
price distortions, the overriding argument in favor of FA seems to be its favorable
impact over SA with respect to curbing transfer pricing.5
Most of the literature on profit shifting and transfer pricing pay little attention
to the nature of competition in final markets and assume that subsidiaries of multi-
nationals are monopolists in their local markets. The focal point in these papers
is how diﬀerences in national tax systems as well as tariﬀs aﬀect the incentives to
engage in transfer pricing.6 However, the nature of competition in local markets
are more often than not oligopolistic (e.g. the car industry or the oil industry).
Under oligopoly, it has been shown by Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) that transfer
prices trade-oﬀ tax incentives against strategic incentives.7 The strategic role of the
transfer price occurs because the multinational can use transfer pricing as an instru-
ment to capture markets shares in local markets and thereby increase its profits.
For example, if aﬃliates of a multinational firm face oligopolistic competition, the
multinational can gain by setting the transfer price at a central level and delegate
3See e.g. Musgrave (1973), Bird and Brean (1986), McLure (1989), Bucks and Mazerov (1993),
and Shackelford and Slemrod (1998). Canada practices a system similar to the US and with greater
emphasis on harmonization of tax bases. Mintz (2000) provides a survey of the US and Canadian
tax rules under FA.
4See Weiner (1996) for a survey of these rules.
5See Gordon and Wilson (1986), for an analysis of factor price distortions under FA.
6See e.g. Kant (1990), and more recently Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1999).
7See Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997); Propositions 3 and 7.
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decisions about prices or quantities to its local aﬃliates if this triggers favorable
responses by local competitors.8 To see why, suppose the MNE sets the transfer
price at a central level, but allows its subsidiaries to set quantities in local markets
(Cournot competition). If the central level sets the transfer price low, an importing
aﬃliate becomes a low cost firm that behaves aggressively by selling a large quan-
tity. Such aggressive behavior under Cournot competition induces its local rival to
behave softly by setting a low quantity. The soft response from the rival is beneficial
to the multinational firm as a whole. Hence, delegation can achieve higher profits
than would arise if all decisions were undertaken centrally. The implication is that
the transfer price has a strategic value in addition to being an instrument for profit
shifting.
This paper undertakes a reexamination of the implications of Separate Account-
ing and Formula Apportionment for transfer pricing activities of MNEs. The em-
phasis is on whether FA may be preferable to SA in a setting where the MNE has
leverage to engage in profit shifting via TP. We show that if competition occurs
under oligopoly and decision-making in multinationals are decentralized, a switch
from SA to FA will not eliminate transfer pricing. Such a reform may actually in-
tensify the profit shifting activities of MNEs via transfer pricing. This result is valid
under even the most favorable assumptions for FA involving international agreement
over both the appropriate tax base to be used for allocating income and the formula
apportionment weights. Such agreement is normally claimed to eliminate any incen-
tive to engage in TP (see Gordon and Wilson, (1986)). Under oligopoly, however,
even agreement over these crucial issues will not prevent MNEs from shifting profits
between countries, as we demonstrate below.
In the next sections we proceed as follows. In section 2 we set up a standard
model of a horizontally integrated MNE that undertakes intra-firm trade in final
8It is well known in the Industrial Organization (IO) literature that a principal may gain extra
benefit by hiring an agent and giving him/her the incentive to maximize something other than
the welfare of the principal. See e.g. Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987), and Fershtmann and Judd
(1987), Katz (1991), and Basu (1993). These precommitment gains have been shown to exist even
if one allows for renegotiation of the contract between the principal and the agent (Caillaud et.al.
(1995)).
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goods. We then proceed to examine the transfer pricing incentives under monopoly
when FA and SA applies, respectively. We show in that section that the problem of
transfer pricing on the part of the MNE, which is present under SA, is eliminated
under FA. Section 3 turns to oligopolistic competition by allowing one of the aﬃliates
to face a local competitor and investigates transfer pricing under FA and SA. It is
then shown that transfer pricing under both FA and SA is determined by both
strategic incentives and tax manipulation considerations. Section 4 compares the
results under SA and FA and provides a numerical example that illustrates the
diﬀerences between SA and FA. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Transfer pricing incentives under monopoly
The model used is one of horizontally integrated trade in a secondary processed good.
The MNE has two aﬃliates, each in one of the two countries to be called country
A and country B. Both aﬃliates are initially assumed to be monopolists in their
respective markets. The aﬃliate in country A produces quantities SA and SB with a
cost function C (SA + SB) , where C 0 > 0, C 00 > 0. Quantity SA is sold in country A
at a price PA (SA) , yielding revenue RA (SA) , where R
00
A ≤ 0, P 0A < 0. Quantity SB
is exported to the aﬃliate in country B at a transfer price q and resold in country
B at a price PB (SB) , earning revenue of RB (SB) , with P 0B < 0 and R
00
B ≤ 0. It
is assumed that the MNE is able to practice price discrimination between the two
markets.9 The profits of the aﬃliates are defined as
πA = RA (SA)− C (SA + SB) + qSB, (1)
πB = RB (SB)− qSB, (2)
and the global before tax profit as
πT = πA + πB = RA (SA) +RB (SB)− C (SA + SB) . (3)
Equation (3) completes the set up of the model. In the two next subsections we
investigate the transfer pricing incentives by MNEs under SA and FA.
9Price discrimination is assumed to exist due to market segmentation.
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Formula Apportionment (FA)
Under the FA scheme, global profits are apportioned to each country based on
the activities of the MNE in each country in proportion to the MNE’s world-wide
activities.10 Under a general formula apportionment system, the tax liability to the
government in country i would be equal to
Ti = ti
·
αK
µ
Ki
K
¶
+ αS
µ
Si
S
¶
+ αP
µ
Pi
P
¶¸
πTi , (4)
where
ti = is country i’s tax rate
αi = weight given to factor j in the apportionment formula (
P
αj = 1)
Ki = capital/property in country i (
P
Ki = K)
Si = sales in country i (
P
Si = S)
Pi = payroll in country i (
P
Pi = P )
πTi = taxable global profits as defined by country i’s tax law
In the above formula the part of the multinational’s global profits which is al-
located to country i is found by weighting the relative capital stock, relative sales,
and relative payroll of that country. To simplify, but without loss of generality, we
assume in our analysis that αK = αP = 0, so that only sales enter the formula.
In addition, we assume that taxable profits do not diﬀer from true profits in each
country so that πT = πTi = π
T
j , i 6= j. By doing so we eliminate the most common
distortions that create incentives for TP. Given these simplifying assumptions, the
multinational’s tax liability to the government in country i is equal to
Ti = ti
µ
Si
S
¶
πT , i = A,B
Consequently, global after tax profits under FA are
ΠFA = πT − tA
µ
SA
S
¶
πT − tB
µ
SB
S
¶
πT
= πTθ, (5)
10The FA system is currently used in the U.S., Canada, and Switzerland to tax national firms,
which operate in multiple states/cantons.
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where θ = SA(1−ta)+SB(1−tB)
S
= 1− t is equal to one minus the average after tax rate
(denoted by t) on global profits.
It is evident from (5) that even if the MNE can manipulate the transfer price
(q) within some limits, the transfer price does not have a meaningful role as a profit
shifting device. To see this notice from (5) that,
∂ΠFA
∂q
= 0, (6)
so that when the aﬃliates are monopolists in their local markets, the transfer price
does not aﬀect global after-tax profits. The reason is that the transfer price cannot
interfere with sales decisions for the two markets.11 Equation (6), then, essentially
confirms conventional beliefs that imposing the FA scheme on multinationals will
eliminate incentives for profit shifting.
Separate Accounting (SA)
Under the Separate Accounting method of taxation each country imposes a tax
on the profits generated within its country borders, i.e. profits are taxed in the
country of source. Although repatriated profits are taxed in the country of residence,
there is general agreement that due to deferral possibilities and limited tax credit
rules, the source principle of taxation is eﬀectively in operation (see Keen (1993)
and Tanzi and Bovenberg (1990)). Taking this into account, global after tax profits
are given by
ΠSA = (1− tA)πA + (1− tB)πB.
If the multinational practices transfer pricing, then over- and underinvoicing will
occur in order to minimize tax payments. In particular, the MNE will set its transfer
price according to the sign of
∂ΠSA
∂q
= SB(tB − tA). (7)
Equation (7) makes it clear that if tB > tA, and if the MNE is not bound by transfer
pricing regulation, its optimal high transfer price is the price that makes profits in
11Taxation under FA will in general influence the MNE’s sales in the two markets, but the eﬀects
on sales run via the formula for calculating the average tax rate, not via the transfer price.
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country B zero.12 Such a price will shift all profits to the low tax country thereby
minimizing global tax payments of the MNE. If tB < tA, it would be desirable with
a low transfer that shifts all profits to the aﬃliate in B.
In general MNEs are not at liberty to choose transfer prices freely, but must
adhere to arm’s length prices. Although these prices may not be accurate in the
sense that they eliminate the profit shifting activities of MNEs, they most often
prevent the extreme cases we have outlined above. We emphasize, however, that
equation (7) shows that under SA, the MNE has incentives to either under- or
overinvoice the price on intra-firm sales. Thus, only in so far as tax authorities are
successful in imposing ’true’ arm’s length prices can profit shifting be completely
prevented. Evidence suggest that this is indeed very diﬃcult.
To summarize our discussion of the FA and SA schemes so far, we may state:
Proposition 1 Under monopoly and international harmonization of national
tax bases, a switch from SA to FA eliminates the transfer pricing incentives of the
multinational firm.
Notice that the success of the FA scheme relies on some quite strong assumptions.
In itself, the harmonization of national tax bases is a formidable task. Furthermore,
the assumption that aﬃliates hold monopoly positions in national markets is not
only strong, but also clearly at odds with empirical observations. In the next section
we will show that introducing oligopolistic competition in at least one market will
cause incentives for TP to reappear under FA.
3 Transfer pricing under oligopolistic competition
We introduce oligopolistic competition into the present set up by assuming that
the aﬃliate in country B faces a local rival. We take quantity to be the strategic
variable in market B, but our qualitative results do not depend on this, as we shall
12A subsidiary, which is incorporated in a foreign country cannot gain any tax advantage by show-
ing losses in the foreign country since such losses in most countries cannot be deducted against home
profits. We assume for simplicity the absence of any carry-forward or carry-backward provisions
(i.e., the period considered may be perceived as long enough for such strategies to be exhausted).
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see when we discuss price competition later on. The competitor chooses optimally
a quantity S∗B. Given the competitor’s sales, the aﬃliate of the MNE in country B
earns a revenue of RB (SB, S∗B) , with ∂
2RB/∂S
2
B ≤ 0, and ∂RB/∂S∗B < 0 (so the two
products are substitutes). Taxable global profits of the multinational are denoted
(as before)
πT = πA + πB,
where profits by the aﬃliate in country B now are
πB = RB (SB, S
∗
B)− qSB,
As before, πA are profits in country A. Before we examine how transfer prices are
set under FA and SA, we examine how the multinational firm will set the transfer
price in the absence of taxation.
When the multinational firm delegates decisions about quantities to its aﬃliates
in national markets, the central authority of the MNE must take into account that
the transfer price will have an impact on the outcome of competition in market
B. A high transfer price, for example, will make the aﬃliate in B into a high-
cost firm, while a low transfer price will have the opposite eﬀect. To find the
optimal transfer price that triggers the most favorable response from the competitor,
therefore, the central authority within the MNE must make sure that the pricing
strategy maximizes global after tax profits.13 Thus, the maximization procedure has
the following sequence of moves. First, the central authority within the MNE sets q;
then the aﬃliates in countries A and B as well as the local competitor set quantities,
taking q as exogenously given. Hence, Si = Si (q) and S∗B = S
∗
B (q) , where i = A,B.
As usual we solve this game by backward induction. For given q the two aﬃliates
set their quantities according to the first order conditions,
∂πA
∂SA
= R0A − C 0 = 0, and
∂πB
∂SB
=
∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂SB
− q = 0. (8)
13Notice that the assumption that there is monopoly in country A does not aﬀect any of our
results in a qualitative way. Introducing duopoly in country A would, however, dampen the
incentive to increase sales in B because of the cost linkage to the duopoly in country A.
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The central authority within the MNE maximizes global profits with respect to
q, and the first order condition is:
∂ΠFA
∂q
=
·
(R0A − C 0)
∂SA
∂SB
∂SB
∂q
− C 0∂SB
∂q
+ q
∂SB
∂q
∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂S∗B
∂S∗B
∂SB
∂SB
∂q
+
µ
∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂SB
− q
¶
∂SB
∂q
¸
= 0 (9)
where we have used the fact that ∂S∗B/∂q = (∂S
∗
B/∂SB) (∂SB/∂q).
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The central authority takes into account the response by its aﬃliates when it
sets q. Hence, using (8) in (9), and solving for (q − C 0) we obtain
q − C 0 = −∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂S∗B
∂S∗B
∂SB
≡ σ < 0. (10)
where σ ≡ − (∂RB (SB, S∗B) /∂S∗B) (∂S∗B/∂SB) < 0 denotes the strategic eﬀect.15
Equation (10) shows that in the absence of taxes, the transfer price will diﬀer from
marginal cost under oligopolistic competition.16 The strategic eﬀect indicates that
it is profitable to set the transfer price below marginal cost in order to render the
firm in country B into a low-cost firm that behaves aggressively by increasing its
quantity.17 This is beneficial for the MNE since the local competitor’s best response
to such behavior is to reduce its sales, thereby allowing the aﬃliate (and thus the
MNE as a whole) to earn higher profits. We can therefore conclude that under
oligopolistic competition the transfer price in the absence of taxation is a strategic
device, which can be used by multinationals to win market shares.
14See Tirole (1988; p. 326) or Brander (1995; p. 1408).
15Notice that σ is taken to be negative since: (i) Under Cournot competition we have that
∂S∗B
∂SB
< 0 for a large class of demand functions (see Bulow et. al. (1985)), and (ii) R0S∗B < 0 since
SB and S∗B are substitutes.
16If all variables were decided at a central level, the transfer price would cancel out in the global
profit function. In this case the MNE would adjust sales in each market according to the standard
rule of marginal cost equal to marginal revenue. With taxation, only the tax shifting eﬀect would
determine the desirable transfer price. With or without taxes, profits of the multinational would
be lower under centralism.
17The competitor’s response hinges on the observability of the transfer price. The multinational
firm has a strong incentive to reveal the transfer price to its competitior. In many cases the transfer
price is observable since custom lists over imports and their prices are public information. See Katz
(1991) for a discussion on the issue of observability in general.
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In the two next sections we examine how transfer pricing incentives are aﬀected
by taxation when FA and SA applies. We then compare how the transfer price is
set under the two tax schemes.
Formula Apportionment (FA)
Under FA, global profits after tax are (as before) given by
ΠFA = (πA + πB) θ = π
T (1− t)
The first order condition with respect to q is:
∂ΠFA
∂q
=
·
(R0A − C 0)
∂SA
∂SB
∂SB
∂q
− C 0∂SB
∂q
+ q
∂SB
∂q
∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂S∗B
∂S∗B
∂SB
∂SB
∂q
+
µ
∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂SB
− q
¶
∂SB
∂q
¸
θ
+πT
∂SB
∂q
(tB − tA)
³
∂SA
∂SB
SB − SA
´
S2
= 0 (11)
Using (8) in (11) and rearranging we have that
qFA − C 0 = σ −
·µ
πT
θS2
¶
(tB − tA)
µ
∂SA
∂SB
SB − SA
¶¸
, (12)
where qFA is the transfer price under FA. Equation (12) shows that there are
two eﬀects present. The first eﬀect, the strategic eﬀect (σ) , is the same as before
and indicates, ceteris paribus, that the transfer price should be set below marginal
cost. The second term (i.e., the squared bracket) is the profit shifting incentive or
tax manipulation eﬀect. Since the transfer price will influence the quantities sold
by the MNE at home and abroad, varying it will aﬀect the average tax rate facing
the MNE. If for instance tA < tB, then raising qFA will induce a decline in SB and
an increase in SA. The weight attached to tB in the formula for the average tax rate
is consequently reduced, and this lowers the average tax rate to the benefit of the
MNE. We conclude that under FA, the MNE has an additional incentive to distort
the transfer price so as to shift profits to minimize its tax payments.
Closer inspection of the tax manipulation eﬀect reveals that its sign depends on
sign (tB − tA) . If tA < tB, the tax eﬀect is positive, indicating a transfer price above
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marginal costs.18 With country B a high tax country relative to country A, the
MNE would like to reduce sales in B by increasing the transfer price so as to bring
down the average tax rate. In optimum, the firm balances the benefits of increasing
its market share in B by setting a low transfer price (the strategic eﬀect) against the
gains from lowering the eﬀective rate of tax (the tax manipulation eﬀect). Since the
tax manipulation eﬀect counteracts the strategic eﬀect when tA < tB, the outcome
is ambiguous (i.e., qFA R C 0) and will depend on the properties of demand and cost
functions as well as tax rates.
If tA > tB, the MNE would like for tax saving reasons to increase sales in country
B (and reduce its sales in A) to reduce the burden of the high level of taxation in
country A. The incentive to save tax in this case reinforces the strategic eﬀect
leading to an even lower transfer price (qFA < C 0).
It is now straightforward to show that if price in country B were the strategic
variable between the local competitor and the aﬃliate of the MNE, a formula similar
in structure to that given in (12) would appear. In such a setting the strategic
incentive taken alone would dictate a transfer price above marginal costs. The
intuition is that a high transfer price will force the aﬃliate in B to set a high price
on its final sales. The local rival’s best response to such a policy is to set a high
price as well. Such non-aggressive behavior by the local competitor is beneficial
to the aﬃliate of the MNE (and the MNE as a whole). The tax incentives will in
this framework be in the same direction as before. For the case of tA < tB the tax
saving incentive works in same direction as the strategic eﬀect, leading to a transfer
price above marginal costs (qFA > C 0). If on the other hand tA > tB, the tax eﬀect
warrants a low transfer price. In this case the total eﬀect is ambiguous, and the
transfer price may be above or below marginal costs.
Summing up, this section has demonstrated that FA will not eliminate transfer
pricing, if there is oligopolistic competition in markets. This, however, does not
necessarily mean that a transition to FA leads to more transfer pricing than does
SA. In what follows we examine transfer pricing under SA, and then compare the
18Notice that
³
∂SA
∂SB
SB − SA
´
< 0, since from comparative statics it is easily seen that ∂SA∂SB ≤ 0,
assuming that the firm is facing either constant or increasing marginal costs.
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two principles of taxation to see if one involves more transfer pricing than the other.
Separate Accounting (SA)
The maximization procedure under SA is the same as that under FA. Notice
that since the MNE delegates decision-making about quantities to its aﬃliates, the
second step of the maximization procedure is identical under the two tax schemes.
Hence, the first order conditions given by equation (8) are valid also under SA19.
In the first stage of the maximization procedure, the central layer of the MNE,
maximizes
ΠSA = (1− tA) πA + (1− tB) πB,
with respect to q. A marginal change in q has the following eﬀect on global after
tax profits,
∂ΠFA
∂q
= (1− tA)
·
(R0A − C 0)
∂SA
∂SB
∂SB
∂q
− C 0∂SB
∂q
+ SB + q
∂SB
∂q
¸
+(1− tB)
·
∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂S∗B
∂S∗B
∂SB
∂SB
∂q
+
µ
∂RB (SB, S
∗
B)
∂SB
− q
¶
∂SB
∂q
− SB
¸
= 0 (13)
Rearranging (13), using (8), we obtain the optimal transfer price, q = qSA, as
qSA − C 0 = σSA − (tB − tA)
(1− tA)
SB³
∂SB
∂q
´ , (14)
where σSA = σ (1−tB)
(1−tA) < 0.
As under FA (cf. equation (12)), the first term in (14) represents the strategic
eﬀect, while the last term stands for the tax manipulation eﬀect. In the case of zero
or identical tax rates, the pricing rule becomes identical to that obtained under FA,
that is, q − C 0 = σ < 0, as the strategic eﬀects are the same, and tax manipulation
eﬀects are absent.
If tB > tA, it is profitable for tax saving purposes to charge a transfer price
above marginal costs thereby shifting profits to the aﬃliate in the low tax country
A. The tax motive in this case acts against the strategic eﬀect, and the total outcome
depends on the relative magnitude of the two eﬀects. If tB < tA, the MNE for tax
19For a full formalization of the delegation approach under SA see Schjelderup and Sørgard
(1997).
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reasons wishes to set qSA < C 0, and this is in accordance with the strategic eﬀect.
The outcome is therefore a transfer price below marginal cost.
If price was the strategic variable between the local competitor and the aﬃliate,
it can be shown (see Schjelderup and Sørgard, 1997) that the strategic incentive
alone would dictate a high transfer price. The intuition is the same as that given
under FA.
We can summarize our findings in this section by the following statement,
Proposition 2 Under oligopolistic competition, both the FA and the SA schemes
provide incentives for transfer pricing.
Whether one scheme induces more transfer pricing than the other is the topic of
the next section.
4 Comparisons of Results
The purpose of this section is to compare how MNEs set the transfer price under FA
and SA. We collect our results from the previous section in the table below (referring
to (12) and (14)):
Table 1
Formula Apportionment Separate Accounting
tA = tB qFA = qSA < C
0 qFA = qSA < C 0
tA > tB qFA < C
0 qSA < C 0
tA < tB qFA R C 0 qSA R C 0
Table 1 shows that the incentives for transfer pricing under the two schemes
qualitatively have the same properties. However, only if taxes are zero or harmonized
do the two schemes yield the same transfer price. To gain further insight into the
transfer pricing behavior under SA and FA we subtract (14) from (12). It is then
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the case that qFA − qSA < 0 if and only if
σ
(tB − tA)
(1− tA) + (tA − tB)
·µ
πT
θS2
¶µ
∂SA
∂SB
SB − SA
¶
− SB³
∂SB
∂q
´
(1− tA)
 < 0 (15)
The first term in (15) is the diﬀerence between the strategic eﬀect under FA and
SA (i.e., σ − σSA). From our previous discussion it follows that the strategic eﬀects
dictate a low transfer price. We may thus state:
Proposition 3 The MNE will have stronger incentives for strategic reasons alone
to underinvoice under SA than FA if tA > tB (and vice versa for tA < tB).
The reason is that under SA, profits in each country are subject to the national
tax rate. The impact of the transfer price as a strategic weapon under SA therefore
depends on the relative tax rates as expressed by the ratio (1− tB) / (1− tA). When
tA < tB, the fraction is less than one, reducing (in absolute value) the eﬀectiveness
of the transfer price. Under FA global profits are taxed by the single rate t so the
’strategic part’ of the transfer price must not be weighted by national tax rates.
Turning to examine the last term (the square bracket) - which is the diﬀerence
between the tax manipulation eﬀects - it appears from (15) that it may in principle
be of either sign. Hence, further assumptions are needed to ascertain whether tax
saving considerations distort transfer prices more under FA than under SA. In what
follows we shall provide a numerical example which allows us to examine the issue
of the relative size of transfer prices under the two rival international tax regimes in
greater detail.
A Numerical Example
To simplify we assume a linear demand function in country A of the type PA =
1− S. The inverse demand function for the two competitors in country B is PB =
1−SB−S∗B, so the two goods are perfect substitutes. Marginal costs are normalized
to zero (C 0 = 0) .20 We set tA = 0.3 and let tB vary between zero and unity. Figure
1 shows the results of the numerical simulations. The two transfer pricing formulas
20This assumption weakens the tax eﬀect under FA since the term (∂SA/∂SB)SB is eliminated
from the optimal pricing formula in (12). However, numerical simulations - using quadratic cost
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which form the basis of the curves in figure 1 are given in the Appendix. The figure
shows the transfer price q under the FA and SA regimes as a function of the tax
rate tB.
Figure 1: Transfer pricing under FA and SA
In figure 1 the bold line (thin line) represents the transfer price chosen under SA
(FA). As is evident from the figure, the transfer price will under both schemes in
general deviate from marginal costs (which were normalized to zero). In particular,
only for tB = 0.475 does the transfer price equal marginal cost under SA, while
tB ≈ 0.78 equates marginal costs to the transfer price under FA. Furthermore, when
tB = 0.3, so that the two tax rates coincide, the transfer price is the same under FA
and SA.
The figure shows that the transfer price is lowest under FA, when the tax rate in
country B exceeds that in country A, and vice versa. One lesson from the figure is
that the strategic eﬀect is quite strong under both schemes. It can further be shown
that for the tax interval tB ² [0.3, 0.6] the FA scheme leads to more transfer pricing
than does SA (in the sense that the transfer price under FA is further removed from
functions - show that normalizing costs to zero does not aﬀect the simulation results in a qualitative
way (simulations with quadratic cost functions are available from the authors upon request). Notice
that even with constant positive marginal costs the term ∂SA/∂SB would be zero in general.
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the true price). Thus there are indeed reasonable values for tax rates where the FA
scheme would lead to more profit shifting than the SA scheme. We state this insight
as
Proposition 4When MNEs engage in oligopolistic competition in some markets,
FA may well lead to more transfer pricing than SA.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the incentives on the part of multinationals to engage
in transfer pricing under formula apportionment and separate accounting. A widely
held belief among both policymakers and economists is that a transition to a system
of formula apportionment will eliminate the profit shifting incentives of multination-
als. Our analysis does not support this belief. In particular, we find that in markets
involving multinationals, profit shifting incentives are not eliminated under formula
apportionment. The reason is that under oligopolistic competition the transfer price
takes on a dual role as both a strategic and a tax saving device. The strategic ef-
fect arises since the MNEs can benefit from setting the transfer price at a central
level, but delegate decision-making about quantities (or prices) in local markets to
its aﬃliates in these markets. Since aﬃliates then take the transfer price as given,
the central layer of the MNE can use the transfer price as a strategic device to
win markets shares in local markets under oligopoly. In particular, if quantity is the
strategic variable, the strategic eﬀect dictates a subsidy to aﬃliates in the sense that
the transfer price should be set below marginal costs of exporting. The tax saving
role of the transfer price under formula apportionment arises, since an increase in
local sales changes the tax liabilities of the MNE via a change in its average eﬀective
tax rate. The strategic benefits may therefore be counteracted or enhanced by the
incentive to reduce tax payments, depending on the relation between tax rates in
countries in which the MNE operates.
Our second policy question concerned a comparison of the profit shifting in-
centives under formula apportionment to that under separate accounting. If tax
rates are not harmonized, the analysis finds that the strategic and tax-saving incen-
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tives to exploit transfer pricing may well be stronger under formula apportionment
than under separate accounting. Whereas the analytical comparisons between the
two schemes do not yield conclusive insights, a simple numerical example demon-
strates that the incentive to set a low transfer price can be more pronounced under
formula apportionment, when the subsidiary of the MNE exposed to oligopolistic
competition is located in the high tax country. A general lesson that emerges from
the analysis, confirming the findings of Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997), is that the
strategic incentives for transfer pricing can be quite strong.
The analysis in this paper has assumed given tax rates. However, besides af-
fecting transfer pricing on the part of MNEs, a move from separate accounting to
formula apportionment may also aﬀect the general level of corporate income taxes.
In a companion paper we examine whether the introduction of formula apportion-
ment is likely to raise or lower taxes (cfr. Nielsen et. al. (1999)).
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Appendix
The two transfer pricing formulas of the numerical example are
qSA =
(1− tB) 43 − 0.7
8
3
(1− tB)− 4 (0.7) , (16)
qFA = q = −
Ã
1− 2q
6
− (tB − .3) 1
2
¡
1
2
+ 1−2q
3
¢ ¡
1
4
+ 1+q
3
1−2q
3
¢
(1− .3) 1
2
+ (1− tB) 1−2q3
!
. (17)
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